

**IDEOLOGICAL TOPOI AND DISCURSIVE
STRATEGIES IN AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI'S AND
ABU BAKR AL-BAGHDADI'S JIHADI SPEECHES:
A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS**

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**UNIVERSITI SAINS MALAYSIA
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by

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AQI	Al-Qa'ida in the land of the two rivers
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CDAst	Critical Discourse Analyst
CL	Critical Linguistics
CIA	the American Central Intelligence Agency
CD	Critical Discourse
DQ	Direct Quotation
DA	Discourse Analysis
DAESH	A Mocking Name for ISIS
DHA	Discourse-Historical Approach
DRA	Dialectal-Relational Approach
Freq	Frequency
FIGH	Islamic Jurisprudence
GTRP	The Global Terrorism Research Project
HM	High Macropropositions
HDT	High Discourse Topic
HA	High Argument
ID	Indirect Quotation
IOPA	Islamophobia
ISI	Islamic State of Iraq
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
MP(s)	Macroproposition(s)
MS	Macrostructure
MEMRI	The Middle East Media Research Institute
M	Macroproposition
ND	News Discourse
ORG	Organization
PO	Politician
PDA	Political Discourse Analysis
RA	Religious Authority
SMS(s)	Semantic Macrostructure(s)
S	Sentence
SIA	Saudi Intelligence Agency
SCA	Socio-Cognitive Approach
SITE	SITE Intelligence Group
START	National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

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**STRATEGI KEWACANAAN DAN TOPOS BERIDEOLOGI DALAM
WACANA JIHAD AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI DAN ABU BAKR AL-
BAGHDADI: ANALISIS WACANA KRITIS**

ABSTRAK

Kajian ini tentang penggunaan strategi kewacanaan dan topos berideologi dalam ucapan politik pemimpin al-Qa'ida, Ayman al-Zawahiri dan pemimpin ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, yang mempunyai perspektif sejarah-politik yang berbeza. Kajian ini terhasil oleh sebab tertarik dengan cara bahasa figuratif dan retorik yang digunakan dalam jihad politik. Sejak kebangkitan dua gerakan radikal sebagai hasil pergolakan perang di Iraq (2003-2011), revolusi Arab (2010-sekarang) dan perang saudara di Syria (2011-sekarang), peningkatan kuasa pemimpin bukan kerajaan mereka menjadikan usaha mereka untuk menguruskan ucapan politik, mengenal pasti topik wacana jihad, strategi kewacanaan, topos, kekeliruan dan alat pengesaharafan mikro mereka penting. Kajian ini mengkaji retorik jihad al-Qa'ida dan ISIS dari perspektif wacana analitis multidisiplin untuk mendalami pemahaman kita tentang kuasa politik dan retorik kedua-dua gerakan. Untuk mencapai matlamat ini, lima buah teks ucapan bagi setiap pemimpin bukan kerajaan dianalisis berpandukan alat metodologi yang diutarakan oleh Reisigl dan Wodak DHA (2001; 2009) dan dataran ideologi van Dijk (1998). Analisis terperinci topik wacana dalam retorik jihad al-Zawahiri dan al-Baghdadi menegaskan bahawa pengesaharafan 'Self' pada dasarnya disesuaikan dengan membina dan mengesahkan 'Other' sebagai kejahatan dan sebagai suatu ancaman pada masa akan datang. Walaupun pihak berkuasa agama biasanya dilayan dengan penuh hormat dan dihargai sebagai tanda penghormatan, pihak ini digunakan sebagai sumber rujukan, prediksi dan bahan hujahan dalam perbuatan ganas. Kajian

ini menyimpulkan bahawa kejayaan al-Zawahiri dan al-Baghdadi dalam memperoleh sokongan meluas ekstremisme dalam kalangan umat Islam melalui taktik retorik mereka menunjukkan penyisihan melampau yang dirasakan oleh kebanyakan golongan belia Arab daripada kerajaan tempatan sendiri secara khususnya dan daripada penaja Barat secara amnya. Keadaan ini menjadikan hujah mereka bersifat politik dan berideologi.

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SPEECHES: A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS**

ABSTRACT

This study on the use of discursive strategies and ideological topoi as reflected in the political speeches of al-Qa'ida's leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri and ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, drawing on different historical-political perspectives, is the result of a particular interest in the ways rhetorical and figurative language is employed in jihadi politics. Since the rise of the two radical movements as an outcome of the convulsions of the war in Iraq (2003-2011), the Arab revolutions (2010-present) and the civil war in Syria (2011-present), the increasing power of the non-state leaders makes it crucial to study their political speeches, to identify their jihadi discourse topics, their discursive strategies, topoi, fallacies and their micro-legitimatory tools. The study approaches al-Qa'ida and ISIS jihadi rhetoric from a multidisciplinary discourse-analytical perspective to deepen our understanding of the two movements' political power and rhetoric. To achieve this aim, five speeches for each of the two non-state leaders are analyzed with methodological tools provided by Reisigl's and Wodak's (2001; 2009) discourse-historical approach and van Dijk's (1998) ideological square. The extensive analyses of the discourse topics in the jihadi rhetoric of al-Zawahiri and al-Baghdadi designate that the legitimisation of 'Self' is basically tailored via constructing and de-legitimising the 'Other' as evil and as a forthcoming threat. Even though religious authority is treated with respect and appreciated as a sign of veneration, it is employed as a source of referential, predication and argumentation for violent acts. The study concludes that the progress of both non-state leaders in

capturing widespread support for extremism among Muslims via their rhetorical tactics is inextricably linked to the enormous degrees of alienation that distance many Arab youths from their own local governments in particular and from their Western sponsors in general, and thus, making their arguments both political and ideological.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Overview of the Study

Few topoi of Islam have occupied Western public eye, scholarly studies and media on a daily basis as much as jihad (El-Fadl, 2005). Since September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Western writers have set out to criticize the image of jihad in Islam which, they thought, was usurped by the two global and local Salafi Jihadi Organizations, al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State (IS) (See Ibrahim, 2013). They usually rendered it as “holy war” in English. Fadel, for instance, maintains that it is connoted with “icons of swarthy, bearded men wearing flowing cloaks and turbans, perhaps riding horses, screaming unintelligible words [and] killing all people in their path” (2012, p.8).

Despite the scholarly contributions to this Islamic topos, what seems perplexing is how differently religious scholars consider jihad (Hassan, 2014). There seems to be many subsequent statements and behavioural aspects that have made this topos mystifying. Jihad, as portrayed by Western writers and as manipulated by Islamic, is often equated with the images of religious intolerance (Spencer, 2008, 2013, 2015). Besides, the concept has blurred the worldly stance of Islam as one of the largest religions. For it is stereotyped differently in Muslim and non-Muslim cultures. The former regard it a sanctioned warfare, but the latter a false excuse for killing them.

Traditional Islamic scholars agree to differ on the meaning of jihad, they accept that the topos of jihad carries a general meaning that is derived from the Arabic term *jahada*, which means “to strive”, but they decide not to assign the same specific meanings to it (Cook, 2005; Hassan, 2014). At the etymological level, the term means “to strive” and “to surrender” to God’s orders, be it in carrying out ritual practices such as praying and fasting or in protecting one’s self from carnal desires (Lane, 1968). The

specific meaning of jihad is a conflict against corrupt enemies (Huzen, 2008). Yet, religious scholars did not fully debate the justifications for armed jihad in terms of its objective interpretations of the Qur'an, prophetic hadiths and the Islamic scholarship, especially those recorded by the two books, *Sahih al-Bukhari* and *Sahih Muslim*.

Jihad, as a purely Islamic topos, has evolved in response to a number of historical and political contexts that construct a range of divine interactions between God and His Prophet, Muhammad in the 7th century (Peters, 1996; Shienbaum and Hasan, 2006; Khadduri, 2007). However, in the contemporary world, mostly after the violent attacks of the so-called jihadi groups of al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State (IS), it came to be seen by Western writers as a method for Islamization; an instrument for converting non-Muslims; a religious rule for booty and a just war connected with notions of *Dar al-Harb* and *Dar al-Islam* and (Bostom, 2005; Gerges, 2005; Armstrong, 2006; Huzen, 2008; Esposito and Kalin, 2011, Ibrahim, 2007). These misconceptions are guided by political explications at face value for the Qur'an and the prophet's sayings.

For example, Spencer (2006, 2007, 2008, 2012, 2013, 2015) wrote more than ten books for different American official institutions such as the FBI and the U.S. intelligence community to inform them that Islam teaches that Muslims must break out a war to impose *shariah* law on non-Muslims. He argues that al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State partake today the same religious obligations and targets the old Muslims had. What is even worse, he argues that American Muslim groups are being enrolled in a vast conspiracy to convert non-Muslims into Islam. Most of his arguments are directed by al-Qa'ida's and IS's actions and claims for applying *shariah* law.

From an analytical perspective, for al-Qa'ida and IS terrorist groups, jihad must be performed through ideological topoi and discursive strategies that are deeply rooted in

the Qur'an, the prophet's tradition, jurisdictional analogy and Muslim consensus (See Ibrahim, 2007, al-Zawahiri, 2010). To achieve that, their non-state leaders have continuously manipulated the historical, linguistic and pragmatic experiences familiar to most Muslims. For example, they rely on the spiritual commitment of all Muslims to refer to armed jihad as a neglected duty for a pure faith (See Jansen and Faraj, 1986; Akbari, 2013). Western and some Muslim scholars, vulnerable to such topoi, tend to see jihad uncritically as an ideology that is representative of Islam. They relate the pointless pursuit of violence of al-Qa'ida and IS groups to discursive tactics of Islamic jurisprudence. This often leads to great fallacies, especially in Western media in which traditional Islamic jihad as such is often equated with 'global jihadism'.

However, one might argue that the topos of jihad in Islamic jurisprudence is a multifaceted process. Historically, it is related to the contextual knowledge of Muslims since the era of the Prophet Muhammad and the first four caliphs. While the Qur'an, the Prophet's hadiths and the scholar's verdicts might provide a framework for conflict, the nature of Islamic response today is determined by the type of context and the threats challenging Muslims in daily life. It is not resolved by the unequivocal accounts of these religious resources that the jihadi groups have tried to transfer to Muslims everywhere.

1.0.1 Discourse Analysis and Speeches of Jihad

Discourse Analysis (DA) is a great part of linguistics that is associated, generally speaking, with highlighting the traces of ideological meanings in spoken and written texts (Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard, 1996; Fairclough, 2002; Weiss and Wodak, 2003; Blommaert, 2005; van Dijk, 2006). One specific meditation for DA is to stress how a political discourse can perplex the social implications it transfers. It focuses on the study of how to unmask indirectness, maneuvering and obliqueness in political

texts (Grice, 1991; Yule, 1996; Obeng, 1997; Wodak, 2007; van Eemeren, 2010). What impacts are there, for instance, when government officials talk about Muslim militants?

Theoretically speaking, discourse analysts, through language, study political belief systems and discursive strategies of social structures that are delivered in a political discourse since they think there are solid and inescapable associations between these elements (Kress, 1990; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, 2009; Hart 2010). These political ideologies and discursive strategies of social structures may have key social effects on human life via the ways in which they represent people by selecting positive words for Us and negative words for Them (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; van Dijk, 1998). For example, one of the IS leaders, al-Adnani, quoted in Weiss and Hassan (2015), uses jihadi language to shift blame from responsibility of crimes, saying,

If you can kill a disbelieving American or European — especially the spiteful and filthy French — or an Australian, or a Canadian, or any other disbeliever from the disbelievers waging war... then rely upon Allah and kill him (p. xvii).

In such a statement of absolute prejudice, al-Adnani uses shift blame as a strategy to dehumanize all nations by considering them enemies of the so-called Islamic State and God. He considers all Americans, all French, all Australians, all Canadians and all people coming from European countries to be disbelievers who must be killed. Whether they have participated or not in the war or whether they are young or old, they have to be murdered in any available means (Weiss and Hassan, 2015).

In such manipulative discourses, al-Qa'ida and IS leaders play upon language with their audiences' beliefs about the future threats in order to achieve certain political goals (Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning and Breen-Smyth, 2011). The use of political speeches by their leaders can tell researchers a great deal about ideological manipulation, the

politics of representation, indirectness in political language, discursive strategies and topoi that reflect the language use (Obeng, 1997; van Eemeren, 2010, Reisigl and Wodak, 2009). Due to its political and ideological significance, non-state political speeches have become vital sources of information and social control of peoples' mental models. Practitioners of DA such as Jackson (2005) and Wodak (2009) have acknowledged that the political speeches are the main actors in shaping the ideology of violent discourse.

1.1 Statement of the Problem

Even though the scholarly pursuit over the US-led war on Iraq in 2003 has produced insightful discourse analysis studies, the resurgence of al-Qa'ida and IS in Iraq as a probable by-product of U.S. policy failure in that war has indeed intensified the need for more in-depth analysis of the jihadi speeches by non-state leaders such as al-Zawahiri and al-Baghdadi. The present study looks at the way macro-ideological premises, discursive strategies, topoi and micro-legitimatory procedures that have been adopted by each one of the non-state leaders to "construct his own legitimacy of jihadi ideology" on the basis of "the de-legitimacy of the other" (Tuner, 2014; Byman, 2015). There is a need for developing alternative contexts and analyses for speeches raising tensions between Islam and the West, which display how religious texts have been misused.

Noticeably, the non-state leaders of al-Qa'ida and IS have deployed their jihadi language as weapons to exert ideological control and make target people believe in their manipulative discourse (Chilton, 2004, Pennebaker and Chung, 2007; Warrick, 2015). Through a carefully constructed discourse, those leaders have purported a new social reality where Western troops are seen as an evil force primarily causing assaults on Muslim civilians, while the *Mujahideen* risk their lives in local and foreign lands

to help innocent citizens combat legions of evil, with Western civilisation itself standing against Islam (Jackson, 2005; Moghadam, 2008, Jackson et al., 2011).

As a non-state leader of the al-Qa'ida Salafi organization, al-Zawahiri, often delivers his religious messages through his skillful use of language. He adjusts the range of his ideological topoi and discursive strategies to implement the order of the speech necessary to entice his audience. These religious topoi have gained little attention from Western scholars. Though Chilton (2004) confirms the need for studying such religious topoi and discursive strategies in depth, critical discourse analysts like Fairclough (2006), van Dijk (2008) and Wodak (2009) seem to pay little attention to religious language believing that it has little power over Western society. They also seem to lack relevant textual and contextual knowledge necessary to analyze jihadi rhetoric.

On the other hand, Arab discourse analysts have recently endeavored to shed light on religious topoi and discursive strategies in the hope of changing their regimes by democratic reforms since 2011, even though they have shown little attention to applying critical theories to non-state leaders' speeches (Asharf, 2011; El-Sharif, 2011). This can be attributed to the dialectical relationship between the response of Arab society and the system of non-state authority: if it is Islamic extremist, it is hard for researchers to reveal to their people the negative images of the non-state Muslim leaders. If it is Islamic and constitutional, however, the task might be harder. Ibrahim (2007) and Spencer (2016) maintain that the non-state leaders' speeches are jurisprudentially complicated and that is why the analysts dislike studying them. To fill the gap, I set out to review the non-state leaders' messages via ideological topoi, discursive strategies (at macro-, meso and micro-levels) and other micro-legitimatory

tools such as presuppositions, implicatures, modality and tropes, as they have been employed in their political speeches.

A more radical religious language has emerged at the hands of a recent non-state leader of another Salafi jihadi organization, al-Baghdadi, who has announced his so-called Islamic State (IS) in the wake of the U.S. overthrow of Saddam's regime (Atwan, 2008, McCants, 2015). In all his jihadi speeches, he has used language and rhetoric for Islamic community to create religious bias against Muslims and non-Muslims (Yetiv, 2013). Even though he did not show strong beliefs in the doctrines of Islam, based on spiritual conviction, he tended to use scared language and religious practices to achieve his political goals (Schmid, 2015). Seeking a rationale for his jihadi discourse, he often needed to touch on a sensitive spot related to the feelings of his followers to show ostensibly his religious concerns and divine ambitions.

I am motivated by the rarity of historical and political discourse studies concerning the subsequent speeches of non-state leaders in terms of the macro-ideological topoi, discursive strategies and micro-legitimatory mechanisms used to construct the legitimacy of jihadi ideology. The relevant literature shows that many Western linguists such as Charteris-Black (2005; 2014), Hart (2010), among others, have studied rhetorical tropes in political language (e.g. allusions and metaphor). On the other hand, hardly could I find any critical discourse analysis combining these two non-state leaders with their political and ideological discourses of the Self and the Other through quotes of religious texts, Prophetic traditions and other Islamic resources.

I will also make use of the notions of topoi and discursive strategies, as reflected in van Dijk's (1998) and Reisigl and Wodak's (2001, 2009) discursal and ideological models, to analyse the non-state leaders' speeches. In other words, topoi and discursive

strategies have been made the fresh fruit of investigation for many years especially after being re-introduced with new orientations by CDA scholars like Thompson (1990), Yule (1996), Chilton and Schaffner (2002), but their actual prominence and significant contribution are due to van Dijk's (1998) ideological square and Reisigl and Wodak's (2001, 2009) historical-discourse approach. The present study consolidates that the non-state producers of fatwas have only made use of different discursual strategies aiming at achieving their own ideological and manipulative aims. On the macro level, these strategies recount to the topoi of their speeches. On the meso level, their strategies are concerned with discursual structures such as how arguments and warrants are presented and how various sections of their texts are constructed. At the micro level, the micro-legitimatory tools involve such procedures as presuppositions, repetition and parallelism, modality and tropes.

1.2 Research Objectives

The study aims at fulfilling the following objectives:

1. To identify the macro discourse topics that al-Qa'ida's leader, al-Zawahiri and ISIS leader, al-Baghdadi, (with different historical-political perspectives) use to construct and (de)legitimise the Self and the Other in their political speeches?
2. To identify the discursive strategies and rhetorical topoi that IS's leader, al-Baghdadi, (with different historical-political perspectives), use to construct and (de)legitimise the Self and the Other in his speeches on global and local jihad.
3. To unravel the jihadi ideology in their selected political speeches.

1.3 Research Questions

The Study attempts to answer the following questions:

1. What are the macro discourse topics that al-Qa'ida's leader, al- Zawahiri and ISIS leader, al-Baghdadi, (with different historical-political perspectives) use to construct and (de)legitimise the Self and the Other in their political speeches?
2. How do al-Qa'ida's leader, al-Zawahiri and ISIS leader, al-Baghdadi, (with different historical-political perspectives) discursively construct and (de)legitimise the Self and the Other in their political speeches?
3. How is jihadi ideology portrayed in their selected political speeches?

1.4 Significance of the Study

It is expected that the discursive analysis can assist Western experts and Muslim readers to critically read and assess the non-state leaders' statements concerning this vital aspect of Islam objectively. It is expected that the present study is of value to linguists, critical discourse analysts, politicians, and many scholars who actually wish to understand the wording and representation of jihad, the representation of Westerns as the "Other" and Muslims and Islam as the "Self". It is also of interest to academic researchers concerned with issues like Islam-West relations and clashes of civilisations.

The body of literature reinforces the hypothesis that political speeches influence public minds and represent political issues from the perspectives their speakers need (Schaffner, 1997; Jackson, 2005). The literature confirms that the effects of the political speeches stem from the supremacy of the manipulative ideologies and discursive strategies that these speeches create. Because of this supremacy, the political speeches of non-state readers have become the focus of many critical analysts such as Jackson (2005), Fairclough (2006) and Jackson et al. (2011).

The foregoing statement could be attributed to two important reasons. The first is, according to van Dijk (2002; 2006), due to the function of the political speeches which

is principally ideological. Language (jihad) is the root of all manipulative ideologies, and so it plays a crucial analytical role in identifying politics. Chilton (2004) sees language of Ibn Laden's jihad as the most effective medium al-Qa'ida's leaders use not only to interact with its followers, but also to characterize the world in the way they need. The second is that the political speeches, manipulation (ideology) and language (jihad) are connected systems for discourse analysis to work on.

1.5 Scope and Limitation of the Study

Five speeches of al-Zawahiri (2002-2012) and five speeches of al-Baghdadi that are delivered over the periods (2013-2016) will be examined. During these periods, global and local jihadism, represented by beheading and burning Muslims and non-Muslims alive has been chiefly performed by al-Qa'ida's and the Islamic State's suicide bombers in Iraq, Syria, Libya and elsewhere (Byman 2015).

Haykel (cited in Rasheed, 2015), when comparing the two organizations, stressed that "violence is part of their ideology", "for al-Qaida, violence is a means to an end; for IS, it is an end in itself" (p.40). Al-Qa'ida's former leader, Ibn Laden, has recruited al-Zarqawi in 2004 to establish (IS) as a local branch for al-Qa'ida in Iraq, but later this local branch becomes al-Qa'ida's greatest opponent. This rift is attributed to the differences in ideology of saving the Muslim community from all those who reject their political beliefs of *shariah*. Al-Zarqawi, and al-Baghdadi later, have believed in violent removal of all Muslims and non-Muslims who do not conform to their literal Salafi ideals of monotheism and jihad in Iraq and Syria, while al-Zawahiri believed that it was not Muslims but the Pan-American institutions of "apostates" and "infidels" which need to be removed (Rasheed, 2015, pp. 40-42).

I really think comparing the discursive strategies and topoi in the political speeches of both leaders is valid because it considers the basic ideas, values and goals of the two

organizations. For al-Zawahiri's speeches, they are collected from Mansfield (2006). According to the translator, the book (in its Arabic version) was completed sometime around 9/11 and was originally published in a serial form by the Arabic-language Saudi newspaper, *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, in October 2001. A second source for the translation of al-Zawahiri's key statements is *The Al-Qaeda Reader* by Ibrahim (2007). The third source will be IntelCenter (2008, 2010) as well as famous websites such as GTRP, SITE Intelligence Group and MEMRI.

Because of the shortage in the translated sources for IS non-state leader's speeches, the dataset will be collected through IS's websites such as *al-Hayat Media Center* and *al-Furqan Media Foundation* (IS Media Wings) which have recurrently translated his letters and audiotapes as well as from several Western and Eastern well-known websites such as START, MEMRI and SITE. The analysis will concentrate on the translated primary sources rather than the spoken ones. Also, the analysis in this study will cover the verbal facets of the speeches (e.g. written texts, radio and other media) and neglect the non-verbal aspects (e.g., body language, gestures, dress and act) in this discourse. Among other interactive devices, visuals will be excluded since the focus is on the written texts which transfer jihadi leaders' central messages to the public.

In short, the study will look at how ideological topoi, discursive strategies (macro/meso and micro level) and other micro-legitimatory mechanisms which are employed to legitimise the Self and delegitimise the Other. Finally, this study stresses the meso-macro strategies manipulated to specify the global meanings of discourse. At the micro level, legitimacy tools such as presuppositions, parallelism, modality and tropes will be examined to show how both non-leaders operate their supporters' minds to commit jihadi operations. These levels of analysis will help in revealing the jihadi ideology in this discourse genre.

1.6 Definitions of Key Terms

This section includes brief definitions for the key terms employed in this study even though they will be explained further in chapter 2 and chapter 3.

1.6.1 Jihad

Jihad is a call to the truth by heart, tongue or hand, under the direct supervision of a prophet or an Imam, or else, it would be a sort of abuse to religion. However, semantic priorities of jihad in Islam are different from those notions of religious and historical realities. Bicer (2010, p.48) stated that “the aggressive conquest came first, and then additional meanings became attached” to jihad. Historically, Ibn Taymiyyah’s fatwas of jihad, under al-Mamluks’ rule, “have been embraced enthusiastically by modern Islamic reform movements” (p.47). Hillenbrand (2000) wrote that jihad for Ibn Taymiyyah is to find “a society totally dedicated to God’s service” (p. 243).

Bicer (2010) argues that there are several significant insights for such a vision. First, the mid-thirteenth century was a time of danger and crisis for Islam. The danger was not simply from external enemies, in the *Dar al-Harb*, but from enemies within, in the *Dar al-Islam itself*” (p.47). Second, “jihad is the path to renewal in Islam, but that renewal requires both armed struggle and spiritual struggle” (p.90). Third, “no one is exempt from the struggle, when Islam is threatened at its very heart to propagate Islam amongst non-believers” (p.91). Unfortunately, the terms such as ‘non-believers’ and “apostate” are often used to qualify many other Muslim sectors. It should not be hidden that many recent jurists nowadays are adopting Ibn Taymiyyah’s notions like Ibn-Baaz and Sayyed Qutb.

1.6.2 Political Speech

A political speech is a political text based on functional and thematic criteria (Schaffner, 1997). Political speeches are a part of and/ or the outcomes of politics. Historically and politically, they are regulated to satisfy different functions due to different political activities.

1.6.3 Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical linguistics has contributed to the emergence of CDA which has been developing since the 1970s. Nowadays, CDA is widely used by scholars to analyse discourses that deal with social and political issues shaped by ideology and power relations conveyed through language (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; Wodak and Meyer, 2001; Wodak and Krzyzanowski, 2008). A critical discourse analysis can be carried out from two perspectives. First, a researcher may start from the pragmatic micro-level and ask which strategic functions (e.g. presuppositions) serve to fulfil politics (Schaffner, 1997). Secondly, he/she may begin from the macro-level, namely the interactive situation and the function of a text and ask which discursive strategies and topoi have been selected to achieve that function.

1.6.4 Al-Qa'ida

Al-Qa'ida is a global militant Sunni multi-national group originated in 1980s out of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan and consisted, later on, of many loosely organized networks (Byman, 2015). It starts to recruit members from thousands of "Arab Afghan" warriors and Muslim-Western radicals from different regions in the world. Hence, its social structures are widespread, yet its groups are decentralized (Atwan, 2008).

The principal aims of al-Qa'ida are to push Americans and Western forces out of Muslim lands, particularly from Saudi Arabia; defeat Israeli governments; and change Pan-American regimes with *shariah* rulers (Ibrahim, 2007).

1.6.5 The Islamic State (IS)

It is a local Sunni affiliate of al-Qa'ida in Iraq since 2004. It is made up of Saddam's former veterans and other multinational militants, even as it recruits young boys and girls as "spoils of war" in Iraq and Syria (Alazreg, 2016, p.148). It teaches them to hate anyone who do not believe in its *shariah* laws, to behead and crush heads of Muslims and Westerns who oppose its dogmatic beliefs, to make bombs at schools and to perform jihad.

IS has been established as a state and as a political organization with an ideology of a radical Salafi-jihadism. That is, it uses the jurisprudence of justification (*shariah*) to enact its applications in various areas. In the name of *shariah*, it performs dangerous and cruel acts such as suicide bombings, bank looting, and executions against those whom it considers as its foes such as Westerns and Sunni-Shi'ite people (Erikha, Putra and Sarwono, 2016, p.71). It also desires to unite Muslims and create, by force if necessary, an Islamic nation following the Islamic *shariah*.

1.6.6 Ideology

The concept of ideology adopted in the present study is defined by its three levels of cognition, society and discourse. Van Dijk (1998; 2006), pertaining to religious references, pointed out that "religious ideologies represent Us as (good) believers and Them as (bad) non-believers (infidels or heathens, etc.)" (p. 68).

Van Dijk's concept of ideology (1998) shows that each group claims and defends its ideological beliefs as true and justified. This kind of schism, as he believes, creates the rift between "Us and Them as two ideologically different groups" (p.65). That is

why ‘We’ is often associated with positive portrayal, on one hand, and ‘They’ with negative one, on the other hand.

1.7 Organization of the Study

The present study consists of seven chapters. Chapter One introduces an overview of the study, statement of the problem, research study which comprises the objectives, research questions, significance of the study and scope of the study. Chapter Two offers the background to the study in the contexts of the politics, society and history. It produces an overview of the terms of jihad in the Qur’an, the Prophet’s hadiths and traditional Islamic scholarship that are adopted and misused by al-Qa’ida and IS while highlighting the political and historical formations of these jihadi groups. Chapter Three elucidates the relationship between language, discourse, politics and ideology, reviews the previous research pertaining to the topic, shows a critical synthesis of literature according to relevant themes or variables, and debates the approaches and theories which delineate the theoretical framework of the study.

Chapter Four presents a detailed description of the research design of the study. It explains and justifies how the political speeches are selected and collected, describes the sample size, data collection methods, and procedures. Chapters Five and Six are mainly dedicated to an in-depth analysis of the ten speeches. Chapter Seven delivers the main findings of the study and puts forward the conclusions and implications reached at.

CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND TO JIHAD FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE TWO MOVEMENTS

2.0 Introduction

This chapter examines the notions surrounding the problem of jihad and the ways in which it has been intensified by the lack of a key account of jihad among Islamic scholars. Additionally, it outlines the ways in which jihadi organizations such as al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State have developed, by placing them into context in terms of how they have been affected by society, politics and history. To understand how and why jihadi organizations have developed and caused such radical changes in present-day life, it is necessary to explore the political, social and historical contexts that have contributed to the prominence of their violent discourse.

Renowned scholars such as Schaffner and Chilton (2002), Weiss and Wodak (2003), Chilton (2004), Jackson (2005), van Dijk (2007), Wodak and Krzyzanowski (2008), Hart (2011) and KhosraviNik (2015) when addressing similar questions, have adopted historical, social and political lens, while Reisigl's and Wodak's (2001, 2009) discourse-historical approach makes a bigger justification. For example, Hart (2011, p.1) confirms that "it is a key claim of discourse analysis that discourse is always produced and processed in context", meaning to say there is nothing out of context. Similarly, Wodak (2008, p.11) argues that the historical and political contexts are "central concepts in our discourse analysis approach". In a similar vein, van Dijk (2007) maintains that "we need to know how local (micro) situations may thus combine with more global (meso and macro) levels of context interpretation and influence" (p. xxxvi). Reisigl and Wodak (2009) name these (meso and macro) levels

of contextual background as a significant knowledge which can assist in the discourse analysis process.


In light the above arguments, it is significant to have these portions of the historical and political contexts of jihad in mind in order to create a sound understanding of the ideological discourse of the non-state leaders and their speeches. Both politics and history are essential factors for investigating the conceptual language used by them to endorse their dogmatic beliefs. Assuming that, the following contexts are meant to be inevitably selective indications of the kinds of long-term memory background that could be retrieved in the interpretation of the two movements' discourse. Within these contexts, the views of the foregoing scholars enhance the argument for this chapter.

2.1 Traditional Language of Jihad: A Contested Concept

In traditional Islam, there are several meanings for jihad, even though, generally speaking, religious scholars and politicians such as Ibn Taymiyyah (2004), al-Jauziyyah (1994), Abd al-Wahhab, al-Banna (1990), al-Maududi (1980), Qutb (2006), Faraj (1986) and Abd Allah Azzam distinguish two major types of jihad depending on the historical and political context: defensive jihad in conflictual context (*jihad al-Daf*) and offensive jihad in peaceful context (*jihad al-Talab*), with an overlapping relationship between the two (Huzen, 2008; Hassan, 2014).

Azzam (cited in Akbari, 2013) argues that when Muslims are under assault, it is a religious duty upon all influenced Muslims to take part in jihad. If they are not able to repel the foe, the commitment first stretches out to different Muslims living around a 90-kilometer distance. If more jihadi youths are required, this distance is reached out until adequacy is accomplished or until it covers all Muslims. As for offensive jihad, it alludes to jihad battles against all *Dar al-harb* or non-Muslims not under the run of *dar al-Islam*. This must be done at any rate once per year by a Muslim runs the show.

Figure 2.1: Major Meanings of Jihad in Islamic Jurisprudence [adapted from al-Jauziyyah (1994, pp.8-10), Huzen (2008, p.5)]



Yusuf Ali (2000) is of the opinion that Muslims have two dominating sources of religious knowledge: The Qur'an, which is considered to be God's revelation to His Prophet, Muhammad, and the Prophet's hadiths which delineate his sayings. Both of these sources show jihad to be a purely Islamic concept. The Qur'an has 114 *suras* (chapters) shaped by 6,234 verses. Of all these verses, only twenty-eight have some reference to jihad, and the definition of jihad is mentioned practically forty-one times. The term jihad is derived from the Arabic root "juhd or jahada which means strove, laboured, or toiled; exerted oneself or one's power or efforts or endeavours or ability" (Lane, 1968, p.473). Also, 'juhd' may constitute the root for verbs that emphasize the meaning of "exertion" and "contest" to achieve perfection in difficult tasks.


Expectedly, ‘ijtihād’, which means “to toil for understanding and interpreting of the Qur’an”, may have for its etymological meaning, the root of ‘juhd’. This is why many Muslim and Western scholarly studies require the traditional rationale of “holy war” or “crusade” to interpret current violent forms of global jihad. Yet, to see whether jihad is a crusade or holy war, or a totally different notion depends on reading the contexts of the term, as I will go into details on the authority interpreting the concept.

2.1.1 Islamic Jihad: References from the Qur’an

Jihad is regularly mentioned in the Qur’an, yet is frequently connected with *fi sabil Allah* (in the way of God). It is critical to note here that the Prophet Muhammad, while in Mecca, received verses of peace that most theological rationalists use to uncover reality about jihad in Islam (Huzen, 2008; Bowering, Crone and Mirza, 2013). In any case, in Medina, the Prophet received full religious and political authority and got full initiative over the entire Medina society. That is why he was summoned by the Qur’anic verses of jihad to motivate his kin to safeguard their properties, houses and belongings against Mecca agnostics (Ali, 2000). Logically, the references to jihad in the Qur’an lies in the 38th, 39th and 40th verses that were uncovered in Medina.

The following verses are considered by Muslim religious scholars among the most vital verses with respect to jihad. They build up how, when, and why jihad ought to be pursued out. They unmistakably express that for a Muslim to take part in an armed jihad, h/she should guard oneself, a property, securing his/her kin and righting an unjust action that happens for a church or a mosque where God’s name is frequently mentioned. The verses construct two criteria for jihad: i) the criterion of the just cause, and ii) the criteria of lawful action (Bowering, Crone and Mirza, 2013). They obviously express that a Muslim can just perform jihad for the sake of setting right a wrong in a critical situation.

Figure 2.2: Translated References from the Qur'an [adapted from (Arberry, 1996)]



Verse (22:38)	"Assuredly God will defend those who believe; surely God loves not any ungrateful traitor"
Verse (22:39)	"Leave is given to those who fight because they were wronged -- surely God is able to help them"
Verse (22:40)	"who were expelled from their habitations without right, except that they say 'Our Lord is God.' Had God not driven back the people, some by the means of others, there had been destroyed cloisters and churches, oratories and mosques, wherein God's Name is much mentioned"

There is additional verse (22:60). It is of fundamental centrality for the investigation of jihad. It reads that "All that; and whosoever chastises after the manner that he was chastised and then again is oppressed, assuredly God will help him; surely God is All-pardoning, All-forgiving." This verse clearly delineates that jihad incorporates a perfect law; one cannot react to an offense in an exaggerated way than the one he got. In the Qur'an, Khadduri (2007) sees twenty-eight verses which motivate Muslims to fight disbelief out of suspicion, of supposition and disbelief out of hypocrisy.

Besides, at a semantic level, I affirm that the implications of what Khadduri coins, as "sacred war" for Islamic jihad is not synonymous to "harb or qital". "Qital" is mentioned around 36 times in the Qur'an and peace is mentioned around 67 times. However, neither in the Qur'an nor in the Prophet's hadiths can one find such an expression as 'holy war' that Khadduri alludes to. Thus, it is a challenge to any specialist to locate the significance of jihad as "sacred war" in the Qur'an.

Table 2.1: Patterns of Jihad in the Qur'an [(adapted from Huzen (2008, p.8)]

Patterns of Jihad in Qur'an	A Brief Explanation
Jihad in Peaceful Contexts	Peaceful purposes and serving God
Jihad in Conflictual Contexts	Jihad against ill-bred and corrupt enemies
Jihad al-Nafs (Carnal desires)	Jihad against one's self
Jihad al-Shaitan	Jihad against Satan
Jihad al-Tarbiya	Educational Jihad
Jihad al-Da'wa	Spreading Islamic Divine Values
Jihad al-Kuffar	Jihad against attacking foes
Jihad against disbelief out of suspicion,	Jihad against illegal actions
Jihad against disbelief out of supposition,	Jihad against false claims
Jihad against disbelief out of reluctance	Jihad against hesitation
Jihad al-Munafiqin	Jihad against doctrinal hypocrisy
Jihad al-Fasiqin	Jihad against corrupt people
Jihad bi- al-Sayf	Jihad with the sword (against enemies)

Perhaps the most debatable of jihad verses is the so-called “sword verse” (9:5). It reads “Then, when the sacred months are drawn away, slay the idolaters wherever you find them, and take them, and confine them, and lie in wait for them at every place”. This verse refers to a historical situation that happened within Arab lands and among Arabs only, but not, as Western writers often assert, among Christians and Jews in their lands. The verse is only applicable to the Arab idolaters, as opposed to the Christians and Jews, who are not to be wounded by the outcomes. I will argue that these various interpretations of jihad are semantic and linguistic gaps which can confuse many Western researchers should they try to interpret the texts literally. This is because in Arabic certain terms may have different meanings depending on their historical and political contexts.

2.1.2 Islamic Jihad: References from the Prophet's Hadiths

As jihad counts as the apex of the summit of Islam and its dome and the way stations of its folk are at the loftiest way stations in Paradise, having a high status in the present world, so too they are the highest in this world and the next (al-Jauziyyah, 1994, Vol.3, p.5). The Messenger of God was at the highest peak of it, so

he mastered all sorts of it: He struggled in God with his heart and soul, calling (to Islam) and proclaiming (the truth), with the sword and the spear. His hours were devoted to jihad with his heart, his tongue and his hands. For this reason, he was the loftiest of all the worlds (pp.5-6).

Next to the Qur'an in vitality is the Prophet's hadiths about jihad that is the traditions of what the Prophet said, taught, and did. These collections are called Sunna or "tradition". In Islam, six of these collections in specific are considered reliable "Sahih". These are *Sahih Bukhari* (810-870), *Sahih Muslim* (821-975), *Sunan Abu Dawud* (d. 888), *Sunan ibn Majah* (d. 896), *Sunan al-Tirmidhi* (824-893) and *Sunan al-Nasa'i* (d. 915). These collections of hadith are in volumes and have a lot to tell about jihad. However, I will examine a number of significant hadiths that are frequently used to reveal the (non)violent meanings of jihad. Al-Manawi in his *Faid al-Qadir* (vol.4, p.511) reported that when the Prophet Muhammad returned from one of his battles, he told his people: "We return from the lesser jihad to the greater jihad." The greater jihad here is a more vital struggle against one's selfishness and carnal desires.

The above hadith which is used as proof for establishing the notion of greater and lesser jihad is weak because it has no reference in the sixth Islamic sources of hadith. Shienbaum (2006) and Esposito (2002), author of *Unholy War*, do not even mention from where they get the notion. Instead, one of the counter-maxim or hadith with a better chain of transmission is narrated on the authority of Abu Sa'id Khudri that the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) said (to him): "Abu Sa'id, whoever cheerfully accepts God as his Lord, Islam as his religion and Muhammad as his Apostle, is necessarily entitled to enter Paradise". He (Abu Sa'id) speculated at it and said: "Messenger of God, repeat it for me". He said that: "There is another act which elevates the position of a man in

Paradise to a grade one hundred (higher), and the elevation between one grade and the other is equal to the height of the heaven from the earth”. He asked: “What is that act? He replied: jihad in the way of God” (*Sahih Muslim*, 20:4645).

The key point in the hadith of greater and lesser jihad above and the likes thereof is that there is no mention in the Prophet’s attitude to Mecca Arabs and Jewish people that would seem a suppression of their human rights as Bostom (2006) and Shienbaum (2006) suggest in their studies about the legacy of Islamic jihad. He is God’s Messenger who should call all human beings to perform their daily actions in accordance with their true nature. Thus, he guides them to their just and moral interests. Like other prophets before him such as Moses and Jesus, he calls upon pagans to accept and obey God, their Creator. Jihad had to be seen in this historical context.

Undeniably, the Prophet Muhammad inspired Muslims to perform jihad over many years obeying God’s commands in this respect, to achieve justice for humankind, but not to risk the lives of Muslims for the cause of advancing a colonial Islamic empire. That is why there is a need to understand the concept of jihad within its historical and political contexts through the holy references: The Qur’an and the prophet’s hadiths.

2.1.3 The Notion of Jihad in Islamic Scholarship

Among Muslim scholars, a considerable conceptual difference can be found concerning the theoretical notions of jihad. Ibn Taymiyyah (2004, vol. 28, p. 349), states that the root of this chapter (on penalties) is to wage holy war against the disbelievers, the enemies of God and His Messenger. Whosoever takes cognizance of the Messenger’s call to the religion of God with which He sent forth, but he fails to respond, must be fought, (until sedition is no more and religion is all for God) (Qur’an, 8:39). He adds as for the People of the Book and the Magians, they are to be fought until they profess Islam or (pay the tribute out of hand). (p. 355).

Jauziyyah (1994, pp 9-10) mentions that jihad against the evil inciting self is, in turn, of four levels: The first is to struggle against the self via teaching her guidance and true faith, without which there will be neither felicity nor happiness. Should the self fail to recognize it, she will be wretched in the two abodes. The second is to struggle against it through putting into practice what one has already known. As for mere knowledge, it only harms the self. The third is to struggle against it through calling mankind to God and teaching the guidance. The fourth is to struggle against it through enduring patiently the hardships of calling to God and bearing all for God.

When all these four features are fulfilled, one will be one of the lordly. For the worthy ancestors agree that a learned scholar cannot be called “lordly” unless he recognizes the truth, puts it into practice and teaches it. He who comes to know, practises and teaches is called “great” in the dominion of the heavens.

Al-Banna (1990), the founder of the *Muslim Brotherhood* in Egypt (*al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*), makes a literal use of the verses and hadiths in his views on jihad to support his ideology of establishing a universal caliphate. For him, jihad in *shariah* is the battling of the unbelievers, and it includes every single conceivable exertion that is important to disassemble the influence of the adversaries of Islam including beating them, looting their riches, wrecking their places and crushing their deities (Aaron, 2008).

Ideologically, he asserts that classical religious scholars are of one assessment on matter of jihad and this is independent of whether these scholars are *Mujtahadeen* or *Mugalideen*. He maintains that regardless of whether these scholars are *Salaf* or *khalaf*. They all admit consistently that jihad is a *Farida* (duty) forced upon the Islamic community to spread the *da'wa* of Islam, and that jihad is *farid ayn* if a foe assaults Muslim Lands. Today, al-Banna sees Muslims compelled to be subservient before

others and are administered by foreign forces. Muslim lands have been assaulted and their (own) belongings, respect and privacy are violated and abused. Their foes are ignoring their undertakings, and the customs of their religion are under the adversary's ward. Still, Muslims neglect to meet the obligation of *da'wa* of jihad. Subsequently, in this circumstance, it turns into the obligation of every single Muslim to make jihad.

As for Faraj (1986), he maintains that jihad is not only mandatory in Islam, or rather, it is the soul of faith altogether. He gives grounds for the necessity of jihad in light of the proofs of legislation, which is the Qur'an, the Sunna and Islamic scholarship. Like Ibn Taymiyyah (2004), al-Jauziyyah (1994) and Abd al-Wahhab, he refers to the most authentic collections of hadith to support his positions and attitudes. He declares that no community shuns jihad except that it suffers intense humiliation, a reference to a report he has quoted from the Sunan of Abu Dawud.

Al-Maqdisi (2010) urges all Muslims to live by the regulation of what he names as "*wala' wa bara*" (Befriending and Dissociating or Loyalty and Enmity). He argues that Muslims should be indisputably faithful towards God. Simply put, a Muslim must be steadfast and wanting to everything that lines up with God's orders. Second, all Muslims need to disclaim everything that contradicts God's commands, especially Western beliefs. His notions of loyalty and enmity speak out a doctrine for all supporters of the jihadi ideology. In fact, his thoughts are resonant among the five doctrinal rules where today's militant grow, for example, al-Qa'ida and IS. The other four doctrines are: "*tawhid*" (monotheism), "*aqidah*" (doctrine), "*takfir*" (excommunicate) and jihad.

A sixth important Muslim and jihadi scholar, Qutb, notes that jihad is not simply a tool limited to the defensive struggle against external violence; nor was it restricted to the spiritual jihad (inner struggle). Rather, he assigns the physical jihad to any practical